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Foreword
by Mary Dunlap*

The emergence of feminist jurisprudence in my lifetime is a
phenomenon that has brought me much happiness. In this
introduction, I celebrate and welcome a new vehicle for this joy, the
Hastings Women's Law Journal,whose first volume you are holding
right now. As you feel the weight of this newborn in your hands,
please pause to consider that there was nothing certain about this
development. After all, women could have entered law in record
numbers over the past two decades and still could have made no
discernible difference in the ways in which legal reasoning and legal
discourse proceed. (Or could we, Mrs. Schlafly?) As the most recent
mass of unfamiliar immigrants into the land of the "seamless web,"
women could have been so gratified and relieved to have made it
"into" the profession of law that we might have set aside whatever
petty ambitions burned into us to turn it upside down, or at least to
improve it as much as our energies would allow. Women could have
studied law and become lawyers and accepted the idea that "gender
is irrelevant" to law, and we might have learned quietly and
deferentially to go along with whatever residual, persistent
mistreatment of women we unfortunately but unavoidably had
inherited, in a system that had made ringing, enduring
pronouncements on the powerlessness of women in order to justify
and preserve that powerlessness. See for example, Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 103, 141-42 ("[t]he paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife
and mother"); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908)
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upholds that which is designed to compensate for some of the
burdens which rest upon her."); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464,
466, (1948) ("[s]ince bartending by women may, in the allowable
legislative judgment, give rise to moral and social problems," a law
prohibiting most women from bartending does not deny equal
protection); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62, (1961) (exclusion of
women from juries is permissible because "woman is still the center
of home and family life"); Goldberg v. Rostker, 453 U.S. 57, (1981)
(holding that because "[w]omen as a group . ..unlike men as a
group, are not eligible for combat," Congress may exempt women
from registration for the military draft). Women could have found
a place in law, albeit less well-paid and un-partnered and lowvisibility and surely very far from the courtrooms and legislative halls
and corporate board rooms for which our "very womanhood
undermine[s] [our] ...capacity," cf Dothardv. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321 (1977) (Court upheld per se disqualification of .women from
prison guard positions in male maximum security prisons because,
inter alia, women might be raped by inmates). Women safely if
inhospitably arriving at the Bar could have been "satisfied with
Susan B. Anthony's picture on the dollar." (Or could we, Chief
Justice Rehnquist?)'
But, so far, the story of women in law in the 1970s and 1980s
overall has been a story of struggle and confrontation and ferment,
and not usually one of acceptance and habitation to the diminutive
prescriptions of patriarchy. We women in law for the most part have
not accepted its chauvinistic status quo, and generally we have not
gone and do not go "along" with traditions and habits of law that
enforce and reinforce sexist models. Our fires to change the system,
even as we have learned to respect its awesome power, and to draw
bread and butter from its daily machinations, continue to burn
brilliantly.

1. At the close of her argument for non-discriminatory inclusion of women on juries in
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, (1979), then-Professor Ruth Ginsburg, a widely heralded
feminist author and teacher who is now an active Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, reputedly was asked by then-Justice William H. Rehnquist, Jr., in
a stage whisper and a rhetorical tone, "Itake it then, that you are not satisfied with
Susan B. Anthony's picture on the dollar?" This verified story has it that Professor Ginsburg
responded politely by not responding.
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In my view, the fires of feminist thought in law bum particularly
brightly because they are unapologetically and openly fueled by the.
twin flames of reason and emotion. Pretentions of neutrality and
assertions of objectivity are replaced by admissions of perspective
and assertions of value. If Professor Laurence Tribe led the way in
1978 in his declaration that "the morality of responsible scholarship
points not at all to the classic formula of supposedly value-free
detachment and allegedly unbiased description . . . [but] to an
avowal of the substantive beliefs and commitments that necessarily
inform any account of constitutional arguments and conclusions," 2
then feminist scholars surely have deepened this path in the decade
since. For those who are pleased, as I am, to see that the
information of feelings and personal experiences are gaining strong,
appropriate attention in legal analysis, alongside the hallowed and
traditional sources of rhetoric and reason, the birth of the Hastings
Women's Law Journal must be considered an especially blessed
event. In the legal writing of this first volume, concerning family
equity, fetal protection, feminist jurisprudence, battered women,
feminist ethics and reproductive choice, the pages fairly glow with
the power of women hearing women, learning women speaking
women's rights. To find room in legal research and writing for
variations, diversity, and outright changes in method as well as tone,
and for the recognition that caring and involvement in a writer's
subject may be sources of insight instead of or in addition to causes
of bias, constitute significant contributions to legal scholarship for
which feminist legal writers must take considerable credit, along with
the ever-available dose of Borkish blame.
In my enjoyment of the emergence of feminist jurisprudence, I
am most grateful for the elevated consciousness that has tended to
accompany the realization that women's "sphere," like men's,
includes law. The ignorance of the normalcy of women in the
universe has been hard to bear; the effort to undermine women in
law by viewing us as sexual objects or metaphors has been exactly
unbearable. Truly I am certain that I could not have borne an entire
lifetime and career of thinking about whether the "[1law is a jealous

2. L.TRIBE, AMmCAN CONSTmTUTIONAL LAw IV (1978).
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mistress." I swear as an eye-witness that this quotation of Oliver
Wendell Holmes was chiseled on the face of the stone wall that
greeted me every day as I walked through the lower Bancroft
entrance to Boalt Hall during 1968-72. The quotation has since
disappeared from my view, making me wonder not whether I
hallucinated it but how the stone was replaced with another, without
a visible scar. I am amused by the fantasy that a group of active
practitioners of feminist jurisprudence stole into the shadows of that
forbidding wall on some dark night in Berkeley and simply wiped
clean the stoneface above which those engaged in legal education
would continue to pass.
Would that feminist jurisprudence could be delivered up, made
to be reckoned with and to be understood so efficiently, so
painlessly as that inscription was replaced, at least in my fantasy.
(Even as I write this, I wonder if it is not reappearing on other law
school walls, in the form of sexist graffiti and curses of feminists and
the other epithets that Hastings College of Law, among numerous
other law schools, has suffered of late.) Would that we who have
felt the howling outrage and appalling waste caused by misogyny in
law could simply sweep the wall clean, and place our messages upon
it for all to see and understand, to elevate the dialogues that would
result high above the categorical denunciations and the raw oaths
against feminists that can be heard, without much effort, in law
schools and other legal milieus even today.3
I know this: I have been comforted and reassured in my own
abiding recognition of the importance--indeed, for justice, the

3. A legal journalist of my acquaintance, whom I shall protect as a valuable source by
not identifying her here, recently informed me that of more than two dozen profiles of
women judges that she has written, not one of those profiled was willing to describe herself
as a "feminist," for recited reasons ranging from the alleged appearance of bias of such a
descriptor to its political hazardousness in the post-Bird era. In a panel at the 20th National
Conference on Women & The Law entitled "The F-Word: Marginalizing and Mainstreaming
of Feminism" (Oakland,.Cal., March 31, 1989), our explorations of the dirty-word quality of
"feminism" established that it is partly attributable to fear of lesbian identification (a fear I
no longer share personally, as an open lesbian, but which I continue to understand well, in
this homophobic world) and to fear of seeming partisan, narrow and opinionated. As to this
latter fear, I suppose all values that we hold require some degree of risk-taking in this
regard; to stand up for what we believe is right will inevitably draw some to say that we are
"special interest" groups, even if we are 53% of the world's population (or more, as men can
be feminists too.)
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necessity--of women's insights and experiences in the teaching,
practice, and development of law, by the voices of women being
heard more and more clearly in the legal system over the years since
I graduated from law school. So here's to the Hastings Women's
Law Journal and to those who have seen feminist jurisprudence as
a source of opportunity and enlightenment in law that deserves the
labor, energy, and resources that must be devoted to nurture and
rear this publication. I hope this Hastings Women's Law Journal is
Clara Foltz's well-earned and long-overdue honorary law degree,
4
albeit in a different form.

4. The path-blazing lawsuit of Clara Foltz that first opened the doors of Hastings Law
School to women, and the life and work of this extraordinary and unabashed feminist
foremother, never resulted in the bestowing of a law degree upon Ms. Foltz, honorary or
routine, though she quested and labored hard for both. Babcock, Clara Shorfridge Foltz
FiMi Woman, 30 ARIZ. L Rev. 673, 715 (1988). But it is hard not to imagine how proud
she would be that a hundred-ten or so years after her litigation, her law school would yield
the Hastings Women's Law Journal

